LABOR LAW: SEVENTH CIRCUIT HOLDS
AUTHORIZATION CARDS EXEMPT FROM THE
ONE-YEAR BAR OF SECTION 9 (c) (3)
IN Conren v. NLRB,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that an employer could not successfully invoke
the electidn year bar of section 9 (c) (3) of the NLRA2 and refuse to
bargain with a union which had presented within the election year
authorization cards signed by a majority of his employees. After an
organizational campaign carried on by both the Retail Clerks and the
Teamsters Unions, the NLRB conducted an election on June 7,
1963, in which the majority of employees voted for no union. The
validity of this election was not challenged. On March 19, 1964,
the Retail Clerks demanded recognition as the bargaining representative for all Conren employees since it then possessed authorization
cards signed by thirty-two of the fifty-three employees. The employer
rejecied the union's demand, contending that by virtue of section
9 (c) (3) of the NLRA he was not obliged to bargain with anyone
for one year after the June election. 4 The union then filed unfair
labor practice charges with the NLRB based on the employer's
refusal to bargain as well as on other conduct of the employer subsequent to the election. The Board found that Conren had violated
sections 8 (a) (1), (2), (3), and (5) of the NLRA and accordingly
ordered the firm to bargain with the Retail Clerks.5
Under the NLRA, a duty to bargain arises whenever a bargaining
representative is "designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees ....- 6 Although it is
arguable that in passing the Taft-Hartley Act Congress intended
that an election should be the exclusive means by which a bargaining
representative could be chosen,7 the courts have interpreted the
"designated or selected" language 'of section 9 (a) disjunctively and
therefore as evincing congressional permission that procedures
1368 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1966), cert, denied, 35 U.S.L. WE=K 3328, 3330 (U.S.
March 20, 1967) (No. 1029).
2Added by 61 Stat. 144 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c) (3) (1964).
3 Conren, Inc., 61 L.R.R.M. 1090, 1091 (1966).
AId. at 1094.
'Id. at 1096.
0National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 61" Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a) (1964).
7See note 34 infra and accompanying text.
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less formal than elections may also be utilized.8 Thus, the use of
authorization cards has become firmly established as an allowable
medium for the selection of a bargaining representative.9 Nevertheless, both the Board and commentators have expressed a preference
for the secret ballot election because of the privacy and independence which it affords to the voter.' 0 Indeed, the Board has expended much effort striving for "laboratory conditions"" to insure
the integrity of the electoral process. 12 There is not, however, an
absolute right to an election;' 3 and if the desires of the employee
majority are clearly expressed through more informal means such
as authorization cards, then the employer has a duty to bargain with
the selected representative. 4 Recent Board decisions facilitating
the use of cards' 5 have increased union reliance on this device in
seeking the status of bargaining representative.' 6
While authorization cards are a substitute for an election, they are
not accorded the same conclusive effect as an election. For example,
under the NLRA, certification is granted only after a Board election; 17 likewise the certification year bar of section 9 (c) (3) is not
effective when recognition is gained through cards.' 8 Moreover,
8See Frank Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944); cf. United Mine Workers v.
Arkansas Oak Floorinig Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956). See generally Comment, Union
Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805, 821 (1966).
0 See, e.g., NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1966); Lewis, The
Use and Abuse of Authorization Cards in Determining a Union Majority, 16 LAn. L.J.
434 (1965); Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 805 (1966).
10 Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 108 (1966) (dictum); see Lewis, supra note 9; Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 805 (1966).
1 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948); 368 F.2d at 176-77 (dissenting
opinion).
12 See, e.g., Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962) (misrepresentation
in election propaganda); Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962) (improper appeal to
racial prejudice); Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962) (employer threats
prior to election). See generally Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38 (1964).
13 NLRB v. Trimfit of California, Inc., 211 F.2d 206, 209 (9th Cir. 1954). But see
note 34 infra and accompanying text.
1I See United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 74 (1956).
But see note 34 infra and accompanying text.
11 Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964); see Excelsior Underwear,
Inc. and Saluda Knitting, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (1966); Randall, The NLRB's New
Policy on Bargaining Orders Following Representation Elections, 52 A.BA.J. 1038
(1966); Shuman, Requiring a Union to Demonstrate Its Majority Status By Means of
Election Becomes Riskier, 16 LAB. L.J. 426 (1965).
10 See Note, 33 U. Cm.L. REv. 387, 388 nn.7-11 (1966).
1T
National Labor Relations Act §§ 9 (c) (1) (B), (e), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§§159 (c) (1)(B), (e) (1964).
28 National Waste Material Corp., 93 N.L.R.B. 477 (1951).
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the protections of sections 8 (b) (4) (B) and (C) of the NLRA 19 extend
only to unions which have been certified by the Board. Although it
is settled that cards do not enjoy those particular statutory privileges,
it has not been entirely clear whether cards are subject to the statutory limitations placed upon elections by section 9 (c) (3) of the
NLRA, which provides as follows:
No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which, in the preceding twelve-month period, a
valid election shall have been held .... 20
In 1947 Congress added this section to the NLRA and thus, by
aiplying the twelve-month bar where the outcome of a Board election is conclusively for or against retention of a bargaining representative, expanded the Board's original rule, which created a bar
only if the union had won the first election. 21 In Brooks v. NLRB,22
the Supreme Court determined that the congressional purpose which
motivated the enactment of section 9 (c) (3) was the achievement of
stability in the area of labor relations. More specifically, the Court
noted that Congress hoped to encourage responsibility in the electorate by according a degree of permanence to election results23 and
to promote industrial peace by minimizing the unsettling effect of
continuous elections. 24 The Court indicated that this latter policy
is especially significant where, as in Conren, rival unions were
competing for recognition. 25 Of course, where a union has won
the election there is the additional policy of providing the winner
with a period free from interference in which to attempt to carry
2
out its mandate.
Where a union has won an election, certification of a bargaining
2Added by 61 Stat. 144 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (b) (4) (B), (C) (1964).
20 Added by 61 Stat. 144 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c) (3) (1964).
21S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 12, 25 (1947); id., pt. 2, at 11; H.R.
R1 . No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1947); 93 CONG. REc. 3838 (1947) (remarks of
Senator Taft); id. at 3445 (remarks of Representative Lane); id. at 8447 (remarks of
Representative Klein); id. at 3528 (remarks of Representative Powell); id. at 6504
(remarks of Senator Murray). See generally Cushman, The Duration of Certifications
by the National Labor Relations Board and the Doctrine of Administrative Stability,
45 MICH. L. Rv. 1 (1946).
2-2348 U.S. 96 (1954), 35 B.U.L. Rxv. 800 (1955), 69 HAv. L. REv. 185 (1955).
28348 U.S. at 100; S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 12 (1947).
24348 U.S. at 100; 93 CONG. REc. 3888 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
25 348 U.S. at 100.
26 Marjack Poultry, 136 N.L.R.B. 785 (1962); Rockwell Valves, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 236

(1956).
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representative has been held to preclude the creation of a representation question for one year unless the certified representative is unable or unwilling to assume its responsibilities. 27 Prior to Conren,
the issue of whether the one-year bar governed the use of cards when
no union had been designated in the election had been evaluated only
by trial examiners. 2 While the respective analyses varied somewhat,
each examiner had refused to accept a blanket application of section
9 (c) (3) as a justification for a refusal to bargain. In Eko Prods.
Co. 29 the Board rejected the notion that labor stability was achieved
by applying section 9 (c) (3) to authorization cards tendered in the
election year. There, in the context of a recognitional strike, an
employer unsuccessfully argued that section 9 (c) (3) provided an
exemption from all union organizational activity during the year
following the employees' vote for no union. The Board stated that
the controlling policy of industrial peace was advanced more effectively by recognition of bargaining representatives rather than by
assuring a year of unimpeded operations for the eraployerso Hence,
in the Board's view, the concern for permanance of elections
appears to be subordinate to the establishment of effective collective
bargaining machinery. However, Ecko Prods., at least with respect
to recognitional picketing, was repudiated by Congress in its 1959
enactment of section 8 (b) (7) (B), which prohibits recognitional
31
picketing within twelve months of an election.
In his argument that section 9 (c) (3) relieved any duty to bargain
on the basis of cards, the employer in Conren relied on the policy
of industrial peace as set forth in Brooks. The court, in rejecting
the employer's contention, grounded its holding on a very narrow interpretation of section 9 (c) (3). The court reasoned that the language
and legislative history of section 9 (c) indicate that Congress was
aware of several means for choosing a bargaining representative, but
that section 9 (c) (3) in explicit terms covers only elections. Since, in
the court's view, Congress had selected one method to implement its
27 See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1954); Lift Trucks, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 998
(1948); cf. Rocky Mountain Phosphates, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 292 (1962).
28 See Strydel, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 114 (1966); Dow Chemical Co., 152 N.L.R.B.
1150, 1164-71 (1965); Majestic Lamp Mfg. Corp., 143 N.L.R.B. 180, 186-87 (1963).
20 117 N.L.R.B. 137 (1957).
"0 ld. at 143, 144.
81
National Labor Relations Act § 8 (b) (7) (B), added by 73 Stat. 544 (1959), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (7) (B) (1964).
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policies, the court deemed itself powerless to extend the application
of section 9 (c) (3) to other means.8 2 The dissenting opinion focused
on the underlying purposes of section 9 (c) (3)and concluded that
the policy of industrial peace dictated that cards be placed in the
same category as elections for the purpose of the one-year bar of
3section 9(c) (3).a
The majority opinion is disappointing because it fails to consider the impact of the decision upon the purpose of section 9 (c) (3).
The seriousness of this omission is compounded by the reliance placed
upon a statutory construction of doubtful validity. The language
and legislative history of section 9 (c) could be reasonably interpreted
to demonstrate that the drafters of theTaft-Hartley Act believed that
elections would be the sole means utilized to select a bargaining
agent. 4 In light of that legislative history, it is not surprising that
section 9 (c) (3) expressly mentions only elections. Yet since judicial

interpretation of section 9 has allowed other representation procedures besides elections, section 9 (c) (3) should likewise be expanded
to encompass these additional forms. Furthermore, in adding that
section to the NLRA, Congress determined that according a reasonable degree of permanence to the outcome of elections would best
serve the interests of collective bargaining by rendering an election
more meaningful as a medium for the reflection of employee desires.
Moreover, section 9 (c) (3) is applicable whether the union wins or
loses the election. Congressional policy to promote stability would
apparently equally control the use of cards within the election year.
Indeed, the permanence of election results is even more impaired
when supervened by cards than by an untimely second election
because of the informality of the card procedure with its concomitant
absence of regulation. Clearly, the mandate of the Supreme Court
that the results of a solemn and expensive Board election should be
revoked by a procedure no less solemn 5 is violated by this use of
cards. Significantly, in the area of recognitional picketing, Congress
reaffirmed its desire to realize libor stability by strengthening the
32 368 F.2d at 174.

83Id.

at 177 (dissenting opinion).
8'See authorities cited note 21 supra. Compare National Labor Relations Act
§ 9 (c), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), with National Labor Relations Act §§ 9 (c) (1), (3), 61 Stat.
144 (1947). See generally Comment, 75 YAIE LJ. 805, 820 (1966).
35 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 99-100, 103-04 (1954); 368 F.2d at 176-77 (dissenting opinion).
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electoral process in the enactment of section 8 (b) (7) (B). s6 Arguably,
the amendatory provisions of the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin
Acts reflect a congressional desire that the encouragement of collective bargaining should be tempered by considerations of employee
free choice and labor stability. However, the Conren case clearly
demonstrates that the Board and the Seventh Circuit believe that the
first step to establish labor stability must be the recognition of an
organized bargaining representative. Thus, it is only after the
selection of a bargaining representative that the policies of permanent election results may be expected to be given effective
application to bar the use of authorization cards. It is because
legislation in the area of labor relations involves sensitive policy
judgments that the Supreme Court has stated that statutes should
not be interpreted with "mutilating narrowness,"3 7 and it is arguable
that the rationale employed by the Board and the Seventh Circuit in
Conren encourages labor organization at the expense of other valid
policies.
30 National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (7) (B), added by 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29
U.S.C. § 158 (b) (7) (B) (1964); Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959: II, 73 HAv.L. REv. 1086, 1103-04 (1960); see note 31 supra and accompanying text.
37 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 US. 219, 235 (1940).

